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McMILLAN v. McMILLAN: CHOICE OF LAW IN A 
SINKHOLE 
Doug Rendleman* 
I N McMillan v. McMillan,1 the Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed its adherence to the place-of-injury rule in resolving 
choice-of-law problems in tort cases and rejected the modem 
choice-of-law methodology now used in a majority of jurisdictions. 
The Court based its decision on the "uniformity, predictability, 
and ease of application of the Virginia rule,"2 even though applica-
tion of the rule in McMillan gave effect to an interspousal immu-
nity that the Court had previously abandoned as a matter of Vir-
ginia law.3 
This article discusses the place-of-injury rule and the more flex-
ible modern approach." It then examines the McMillan decision 
and concludes that the Supreme Court missed an excellent oppor-
tunity to overrule an anachronistic doctrine. 
I. THE PLACE-OF-INJURY RULE 
Social and economic life spills over political boundaries. Many 
events, transactions, and relationships are connected with two or 
more political jurisdictions that uphold different legal doctrines. 
When events produce different legal consequences in various 
jurisdictions, disputants shop for a favorable forum. The neutral 
adjudicator must choose one of the competing doctrines adduced 
by the self-interested adversaries. This inquiry is called choice of 
law. The judge's task is exacerbated by the jurisdictional com-
plexity of the federal system and the need to consider the impact 
of procedural rules on the substantive purposes of the judicial 
system. 
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The author thanks Howard Hill for 
assistance in preparing this article. 
1 219 Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979). 
s Id. at 1131, 253 S.E.2d at 664. 
s See Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971). See note 35 infra. 
4 See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 6, 145 (1971) (quoted respec-
tively in notes 47 & 27 infra). In this article, "Second Restatement" is used in lieu of the 
formal title. 
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Justice Story's influential views dominated American choice-of-
law theory well into the present century.5 Story perceived the sov-
ereignty of the states as mutually exclusive. According to this the-
ory, each state possesses full power to bind persons and property 
within its territory, but the force that a state's laws receive else-
where depends solely on whether other jurisdictions choose to de-
fer to those laws. This territorial perspective became known as the 
vested rights theory because it deems a right of action acquired 
within the territory and under the law of one state to be fixed and 
vested as against the law of any other jurisdiction. 6 Story's views 
were eventually incorporated into the first Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws7 and achieved almost universal acceptance.8 
In tort actions, the territorial or vested rights approach to choice 
of law holds that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was 
committed, or lex loci delicti, determines the defendant's liability.e 
To identify the governing jurisdiction, a judge simply characterizes 
the issue as one of tort law and determines the site of the injury. 
Courts adopted this approach in the belief that it would lead to 
uniform and predictable results.10 
The notion that the place-of-injury rule is easy to apply and pro-
duces certain results has proved, however, to be an illusion. In the-
ory, the place-of-injury rule identifies the controlling jurisdiction 
without referring to the content of the domestic law of the forum 
or any other jurisdiction. A review of the case law demonstrates 
that, in fact, courts have often refused to apply foreign doctrines 
that violate the public policy of the forum, even when territorial 
choice-of-law rules clearly call for the application of foreign law.11 
• See J. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 18, 20, 23 (2d ed. Boston 
1841) (1st ed. Boston 1834). 
• SeeR. Llm.AR, AMEmcAN CoNFLICTS LAw§ 86, at 173 (3d ed. 1977). 
7 See REsTATEMENT OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 377, Comment a (19:!4). See generally id. 
§§ 377-390. 
• See, e.g., REsTATEMENT 1N THE CoURTS 293-300 (perm. ed. 1945). Professor Beale also 
adopted the vested rights approach in his own influential treatise. See 2 J. BEALE, A TREA-
TISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 378.2 (1935). 
• See REsTATEMENT OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 378 (1934) ("The law of the place of wrong 
determines whether a person has suffered a legal injury."). 
10 See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S:2d 743,-
746-47 (1963) (discussing and rejecting the place-of-injury rule). 
11 See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928); 
Hudson v. Continental Bus System, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). See also R. 
LEFLAR, supra note 6, § 43; R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAw § 3.6 (2d 
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Imaginative judges have circumvented odious applications of the 
place-of-injury rule by characterizing particular issues as proce-
dural or as turning on substantive law other than tort, and they 
have thereby manipulated choice-of-law principles so as to favor 
the law of the forum.12 For example, in Kilberg v. Northeast Air-
lines, Inc., 18 a New York court faced a domiciliary's wrongful death 
action involving an airplane crash in Massachusetts. Refusing to 
apply a Massachusetts statute limiting damages in such cases, the 
court ruled that the measure of damages is a remedial or proce-
dural question to be decided under local law. u Similarly, in Haum-
schild v. Continental Casualty Co., 15 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin permitted a woman to sue her husband for injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident in California and thus de-
clined to recognize California's interspousal immunity doctrine. 
The court held that the capacity of spouses to sue one another is a 
question of "family law" controlled by the law of the domicile.18 
In resorting to characterization, a judge accepts the premises of 
the vested rights rule and merely switches labels to achieve a 
palatable result. The use of such conclusory labeling inevitably 
leads to capricious decisions.17 Would the Haumschild court recog-
nize California's immunity doctrine if the wife sued a California 
driver, instead of her husband, and the defendant impleaded the 
husband for contribution as a joint tort-feasor? If the case were 
ed. 1980); notes 14 & 16 infra. 
11 See generally REsTATEMENT OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 332 (1934) (law of the place of 
contracting governs the validity of a contract); id. § 372 (law of the place of performance 
governs the right to damages for breach of contract and the measure of damages); id. § 585 
("All matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum.''). 
11 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). 
14 Id. at 39-42, 172 N.E.2d at 528-29, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135-38. The clear predicate of the 
Kilberg decision was "New York's pubHc poHcy prohibiting the imposition of limits on .•. 
damages," a policy the court described as "strong, clear and old." Id. at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 
528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135·36. To implement that poHcy, the court resorted to the traditional 
choice·of-law rule that the law of the forum determines whether a particular issue is sub-
stantive or procedural. Id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. 
11 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). 
11 Id. at 137-40, 95 N.W.2d at 818-19. Underlying this decision were "strong reasons of 
public policy ••• for supplanting [the place-of·injury] rule by a better one which does not 
unnecessarily discriminate against the citizens of our own state.'' Id. at 138, 95 N.W.2d at 
818. 
17 See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 11, § 6.15, at 298-99; Hancock, The Rise and Fall of 
Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959: Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 237, 253 (1962). 
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litigated in a California court, could the defendant, as third-party 
plaintiff, defeat the husband's immunity defense by invoking Wis-
consin family law? The results of such disputes would be very 
much in doubt and might contravene the substantive policy of the 
Haumschild decision.18 
Ultimately, characterization proves an unsatisfactory technique 
for solving choice-of-law problems because it yields inconsistent re-
sults and serves substantive policies in an unpredictable manner. 
Many courts have recognized the intellectual shallowness and prac-
tical arbitrariness of a method that skirts, rather than rejects out-
right, the rigid place-of-injury rule. In growing numbers, courts are 
discarding the traditional, rule and turning instead to an analysis 
that expressly weighs substantive policies and applies the law of 
the jurisdiction having the greatest policy interest in the matter .18 
II. THE MoDERN APPROACH 
A. The Babcock Decision 
An explicitly policy-oriented approach to resolving choice-of-law 
issues in tort cases first gained judicial acceptance in Babcock v. 
Jackson,20 decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1963.21 A 
New York guest passenger filed suit in a New York court against a 
New York host driver for an accident that occurred in Ontario. 
The plaintiff's allegation of ordinary negligence stated a claim 
under New York law, but the trial court duly applied the place-of-
18 See note 16 supra. 
18 See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 11, § 6.15, at 301 (describing characterization 
as "an important bridge between the rigid territorialism of place-of-wrong and a new policy-
oriented analysis"). 
so 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). 
11 The Babcock court drew from a preliminary draft of the Second Restatement the prop-
osition that" '[t]he local law of the state which bas the most significant relationship with 
the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort.' " I d. at 
482, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749-50 (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoN-
FLICT OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963)). While the draft of the Second Restatement 
accurately summarized the real meaning of the better authorities, see, e.g., notes 14 & 16 
supra and accompanying text, Babcock was the fJ.rSt decision to reject squarely the place-of-
injury rule, see Tlautman, A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 465, 467 (1967). The same court 
had earlier led a move away from traditional choice-of-law rules in contract, see generally 
note 12 supra, toward the "center of gravity" inquiry endorsed in Babcock, see Auten v. 
Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), discussed in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d at 
479, 191 N.E.2d at 282, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 747. 
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injury rule and dismissed the action because Ontario law immu-
nized the host from liability to the guest except on a showing of 
gross negligence. 
Reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeals held 
New York law controlling as to the applicable standard of liability. 
The appellate court first noted that New York contacts dominated 
the guest-host relationship. The trip began and would have ended 
in New York; both parties were domiciled in New York; and the 
vehicle was registered and presumably insured in New York.22 By 
contrast, the only Ontario contact was the fortuitous site of the 
accident.28 The court then rejected the vested rights doctrine in 
favor of a more flexible inquiry: 
"The vice of the vested rights theory", it has been aptly stated, "is 
that it affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do 
not state the practical considerations involved". More particularly, 
as applied to torts, the theory ignores the interest which jurisdic-
tions other than that where the tort occurred may have in the reso-
lution of particular issues. . . . 
. . . Justice, fairness and the "best practical result" may best be 
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction 
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or 
the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised 
in the litigation. The merit of such a rule is that "it gives to the 
place 'having the most interest in the problem' paramount control 
over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context" and 
thereby allows the forum to apply "the policy of the jurisdiction 
'most intimately concerned with the outeome of [the] particular 
litigation.' " 14 
Finally, the court found that New York's policy of compensating 
tort victims outweighed whatever minimal interests Ontario might 
have asserted to the contrary.25 
u 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. The facts in Babcock are 
comparable to those confronted by the Virginia Court in McMillan. See notes 33-36 infra 
and accompanying text. 
"' 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. 
u I d. at 478, 481-82, 191 N.E.2d at 281, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746, 749 (citations omitted) • 
.. See id. at 482-85, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-52. The court observed: 
"Whether New York defendants are imposed upon or their insurers defrauded by a New 
York plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative concern of Ontario simply becauSe the accident 
occurred there, any more so than if the accident had happened in some other jurisdiction." 
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B. The Second Restatement 
The Babcock decision accords with the choice-of-law method de-
veloped in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.26 SectiQn 
145 of the Second Restatement molds a choice-of-law test for tort 
cases that applies the law of the jurisdiction possessing the "most 
significant relationship" with the issue.•7 This method calls for the 
court to weigh the jurisdictions' competing interests by examining 
the policies underlying the doctrines in conflict. In Babcock, for 
example, New York's policy of compensating residents who fall vic-
tim to negligent conduct by fellow residents clearly outweighed 
Ontario's policy of limiting_the liability of host drivers, for the case 
involved no citizen or insurer whom Ontario had a valid interest in 
protecting. 
Since Babcock. twenty-seven states, Puerto Rico, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have abandoned the place-of-injury rule as dis-
positive of choice-of-law issues in tort cases,28 while ten states have 
Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. 
" See note 21 supra, 
S? The Second Restatement directs courts to consider "(a) the place where the injury 
occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, resi-
dence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of tbe parties, and (d) the 
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered," and to evaluate these 
factors "according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 145. These specific considerations are to be 
marshaled in the service of more general principles set forth in § 6 of tbe Second Restate-
ment. See id.; id. § 6 (quoted in note 47 infra). 
" See Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 
699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Wallis v. Mrs. 
Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 
P.2d 727, 63 Cal Rptr. 31 (1967); First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 
(1973); Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Ingersoll v. Klein, 
46 TIL 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind. App. 655, 237 N.E.2d 
116 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 251 Ind. 575, 243 N.E.2d 876 (1969); Fuerste v. Bemis, 
156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Jagers v. Royal 
lndem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); 
Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 
139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Turner v. Pickens, 235 So. 2d 272 (Miss. 1970); Kennedy v. 
Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Schneider v. Schneider, 110 N.H. 70, 260 A.2d 97 (1969); 
Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 
N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); Fox v. Morrison Moter Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 
N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 
1974); Defoor v. Lematta, 249 Or. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 
620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); Fernandez v. American Sur. Co., 93 P.R.R. 28 (1966); Brown v. 
Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969); Gutierrez v. Collins, 
583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wasb. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 
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decided to retain that rule.29 The trend against the place-of-injury 
rule has apparently gained renewed momentum in the last year, 
with two jurisdictions adopting the "most significant relationship" 
test10 and another moving to reconsider the traditional rule.11 Now 
that the place-of-injury rule is demonstrably the minority view, 
more courts can be expected to reject the vested rights doctrine 
and to adopt the majority's policy-oriented rule. 
m. VmGINIA REAFFmMS THE PLACE-OF-INJURY RULE 
The Supreme Court of Virginia chose to retain the traditional 
place-of-injury rule in McMillan v. McMillan. 82 McMillan posed a 
factual pattern that other courts and commentators have seen as 
the "easy case" that demands adoption of a policy-oriented ap-
proach: a lawsuit between residents of the forum state concerning 
an accident that occurred in another jurisdiction. 11 This section 
examines the McMillan decision and concludes that its rationale is 
unconvincing and that the Court failed to understand the virtues 
of the modem approach. 
A. The McMillan Decision 
In 1975, Glenna McMillan was injured while a passenger in an 
(1976); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). 
,. See St. Pierre v. St. Pierre, 158 Conn. 620, 262 A.2d 185 (1969); Friday v. Smoot, 58 
Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594 (1965); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); White 
v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966); Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 
N.W.2d 137 (1969); Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); 
Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 
N.W.2d 164 (1972); Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); McMillan v. McMillan, 
219 Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979). 
10 See Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paiut Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Gutierrez v. 
Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (TeL 1979). See also Riley, Abandonment of Lex Loci Delicti in 
Texas: The Adoption of the Most Significant Relationship Test, 33 Sw. L.J. 1221 (1980). 
11 See Sterie v. Southfield Leasing, Inc., 407 Mich. 908, 285 N.W.2d 39 (1979) (granting 
leave to appeal). 
aa 219 Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979). 
aa See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (dis-
cussed at notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text); Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus 
Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975, 1033 
(1977) (quoted in text accompanying note 59 infra); Trautman, supra note 21, at 467. Pro-
fessor Weintraub maintains that facts like those in McMillan raise only "spurious" conflicts 
of law, as the foreign jurisdiction has no valid interest in precluding recovecy. See R. WEIN-
TRAUB, supra note 11, § 6.9, at 278-79. See note 55 infra. 
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automobile driven by her husband David on a social visit in Ten-
nessee.3" Charging that the accident was caused by the joint negli-
gence of David and the unidentified driver of a second vehicle, 
Glenna filed suit against them both in the Virginia circuit court. 
Under the domestic law of Virginia, a plaintiff may recover dam-
ages when injured in an automobile accident caused by a spouse's 
negligent conduct.315 Tennessee, however, retains an interspousal 
immunity doctrine barring such an action.36 The trial court, apply-
ing the place-of-injury rule to resolve the choice-of-law issue, sus-
tained David's defense of interspousal immunity and dismissed the 
action.37 
On appeal, the plaintiff urged the Supreme Court to abandon 
the place-of-injury rule in favor of the modern rule exemplified by 
Babcock and the Second Restatement.38 The Court, however, af-
firmed dismissal of the action and expressly refused to adopt the 
modern rule.39 The brief opinion emphasizes the "uniformity, pre-
dictability, and ease of application""0 of the traditional rule and· 
criticizes the policy-centered approach as "susceptible to incon-
stancy, particularly when, as here, the issue involves the substan-
.. The accident occurred 300 yards from the Virginia-Tennessee border, at the entrance 
to a bridge connecting the two states. Brief for Appellant at 2, McMillan v. McMillan, 219 
Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979). 
"' See Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971). In Surratt, the Supreme 
Court abolished Virginia's interspousal immunity doctrine with respect to personal injuries 
inflicted in automobile accidents. Id. at 193-94, 183 S.E.2d at 201-02. See generally Note, 
Intrafamily Tort Immunity in Virginia: A Doctrine in Decline, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 273 
(1979). See also Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195 (1975) (rejecting inter-
spousal immunity in wrongful death action for the murder of a spouse). Surratt and Kor-
man, however, are exceptions to a general rule recognizing interspousal immunity in Vir-
. ginia. Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 154-55, 266 S.E.2d 895, 896-97 (1980) (barring 
husband's action against ex-wife for injuries sustained at her instigation in a murder-for-
hire scheme), discussed in Wadlington, Virginia Domestic Relations Law: Recent Develop-
ments, 67 VA. L. REv. 351, 354-55 (1981). 
as See Wooley v. Parker, 222 Teun. 104, 107-11, 432 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (1968), cited with 
approval in Childress v. Childress, 569 S.W.2d 816, 817-18 (Tenn. 1978). 
a• See 219 V a. at 1129, 253 S.E.2d at 663. Glenna received a judgment of $150,000 against 
the unidentified driver. Letter from Carl E. McAffee, attorney for plaintiff McMillan, to 
author (July 30, 1980) (copy on me with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
as In regard to issues of intrafamily immunity, the Second Restatement notes that "[t]he 
applicable law will usually be the local law of the state of the parties' domicil." REsTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) oF CoNFLICT oF LAws § 169(2) (1971). 
ao · 219 V a. at 1128, 1131, 253 S.E.2d at 663, 665. 
•• Id. at 1131, 253 S.E.2d at 664. 
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tive existence of a cause of action in tort."41 
The Court's characterization of the modern rule betrays an im-
perfect understanding of that approach. The basic premise of cur-
rent theory is that a court should give effect to the law of that 
jurisdiction whose policies are most intimately involved in the 
question at band.42 The Court, however, made no apparent effort 
to evaluate the relative interests of Tennessee and Virginia in re-
gard to whether spousal immunity should apply in McMillan. In-
stead, the Court assumed that the method espoused by the Second 
Restatement turns solely on "an analytical examination of the 
facts of each case to determine what law should govern the parties' 
substantive rights."48 The opinion seems to conclude that the 
"most substantial relationship" test mechanically applies the law 
of the jurisdiction having the greater number of contacts with the 
case, regardless of the nature of those contacts."" In short, the 
Court failed to differentiate arbitrary contact-counting from a 
method that inquires into the policies implicated in the choice of 
law. 
The McMillan Court quoted section 145 of the Second Restate-
ment, which lists such physical contacts as the place where the 
wrongful conduct or injury occurred, the place where the parties 
reside, and the place where the parties' relationship is centered."5 
Section 145, though, merely supplements section 6,48 which sets 
forth the guiding principles of the "most significant relationship" 
inquiry and instructs the adjudicator to consider, among other 
things, the "relevant policies" of the forum and "other interested 
states."47 Thus, the methodology of the Second Restatement re-
<1 ld. 
•• See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text. 
•• 219 Va. at 1129, 253 S.E.2d at 663. 
•• Commentators who support the modem methodology have acknowledged the danger 
that it will degenerate in practice to mere contact-counting. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, supra note 
6, § 136, at 278; Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of 
Laws (Currie), 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1233-34 (1963); Weintraub, A Method for Solving 
Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CoRNELL L.Q. 215, 244 (1963). 
•• REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLicr OF LAWS§ 145 (1971), quoted in McMillan v. Mc-
Millan, 219 Va. at 1129-30, 253 S.E.2d at 663-64. 
•• See id.; id. § 6 (quoted in note 47 infra). 
•• The general principles are set forth as follows: 
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of 
its own stato on choice of law. 
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the appli-
324 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 67:315 
quires the judge to select the state with the "most significant rela-
tionship" in two steps: First, to identify the relevant contacts and, 
second, to evaluate the contacts in light of the policies of the con-
flicting doctrines. The Supreme Court recognized only ·the rust· 
step and then quickly returned to the place-of-injury rule .. 
B. Consistency under the Modem Approach 
The Supreme Court failed to examine its assertion that the mod-
em approach produces decisions less consistent and predictable 
than those resulting from the wooden place-of-injury rule. As evi-
dence of the inconsistency ascribed to the modern approach, the 
McMillan Court cited the New York case of Kell v. Henderson.Cs as 
irreconcilable with the earlier opinion of the New York Court. of 
Appeals in Babcock. Kell involved the converse situation from that 
presented in Babcock: a guest passenger was injured while the par-
ties, both of whom were residents of Ontario, were visiting New 
Y ork.49 Although Babcock might be read as favoring the applica- · 
tion of Ontario law in these circumstances, the Kell court held that 
New York law controlled the applicable standard of liability.150 The 
McMillan Court, quoting Professor Leflar, found the apparent· 
contradiction between the two cases" 'indicat[ive] [of] the manip-
ulative possibilities that inhere in the Babcock approach.' "151 
Babcock and Kell are poor representatives of the current choice-
cable rule of law include 
Id. § 6. 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) · the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of 
those states in the determination of the particular issue, · 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law tO be applied. 
•• 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd, 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 
(1966), discussed in McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. at 1131, 253 S.E.2d at 664. · 
•• 47 Misc. 2d at 992-93, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 648. . 
ao Id. at 995-96, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51. 
81 219 Va. at 1131, 253 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting R. LEFLAR, supra note 6, § 91, at 184). The 
Court failed to note that although Professor Leflar decries the inconsistency of New York's 
decisions, be prefers the Babcock approach to the vested rights rule. See Leflar, Choice of 
Law: A Well- Watered Plateau, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB., Spring 1977, at 10, 21. See also 
note 58 infra and accompanying text. 
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of-law method. Like many judicial innovations, the Babcock opin-
ion was imprecisely stated because the court wrote on a clean slate. 
As such, the opinion "produced inevitable confusion in the later 
cases."11 Other courts have been careful to learn from New York's 
mistakes and have developed the consensus reflected in the Second 
Restatement.11 New York, however, continues to err. It announced 
procrustean rules in advance of concrete lawsuits presenting well-
defmed issues." Moreover, Kellleaves the New York court vulner-
able to the criticism that it has reduced the central governmental-
interest analysis to a preference for residents over nomesidents or, 
in short, to "self-serving. parochialism."15 
IS Leflar, supra note 51, at 19. See Rosenberg, An Opinion for the New York Court of 
Appeals, 67 CoLUY. L. REv. 459, 461-62 (1967). 
IS See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text. 
14 See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 11, §§ 6.20 to .21; Sedler, supra note 33, at 994 . 
.. von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 
Spring 1977, at 27, 34 (1977). See also Leflar, supra note 51, at 20. This criticism, however, 
may reflect a superficial analysis of Kell. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 11, §§ 6.9 to .10. 
See also Trautman, supra note 21, at 467, 472-73. Plainly, the Ontario driver did not sus-
pend his instinct for self-preservation and drive about negligently (but not recklessly) in 
New York in reliance on the protection of the Ontario guest statute. On the other hand, 
New York has a valid interest in imposing liability on nonresidents who engage in risk-
creating conduct within its borders. Cf. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574,522 P.2d 
666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974) (applying California law te determine the measure of damages 
in a Mexican's wrongful death action involving an accident in California). New York may 
a1ao be interested in compensating nonresidents injured there to prevent them from becom-
ing wards of the state and to protect their local crediters. Finally, New York courts may 
perceive Ontario's guest statute as a harsh anachronism and consider it their duty to apply 
the "better law" to residents and nonresidents alike. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 
155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Gagne v. Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972); Conklin v. 
Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). Arguably, however, the notion that the 
forum must do justice according to its own standards, regardless of the policies of other 
interested jurisdictions, smacks of the territorial view of sovereignty that underlies the 
vested rights rule, see generally note 5 supra and accompanying text, and ignores the inter-
est-balancing that is central to modem choice-of-law theory, see generally notes 20-27 supra 
and accompanying text. 
Under the "most significant relationship" test, Kell is a harder case than Babcock or Mc-
Millan. When, as in Babcock and McMillan, the fortuitous situs of an accident provides the 
sole contact with a foreign jurisdiction, that jurisdiction has no valid interest in barring 
recovery, and any conflict on that point of law is therefore "spurious." See R. WEINTRAUB, 
supra note 11, § 6.9, at 278. See also Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 
284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (quoted in note 25 supra). When, as in Kell, however, the parties 
may be using the forum to circumvent the law of their domicile, the interests of the foreign 
jurisdiction become more significant and may pose a "real" conflict. See R. WEINTRAUB, 
supra note 11, § 6.15, at 298; Trautman, supra note 21, at 467. Conversely, the interests of 
the forum state are diminished by the fact that "the social and economic consequences of 
the accident will be felt in [the domicile)." Sedler, supra note 33, at 1035. Nevertheless, the 
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It has already been shown that courts laboring under the vested 
rights doctrine often produce inconsistent results in striving to 
avoid unjust applications of the rule. 116 Moreover, the inconsistency 
that the Virginia Court attributed to the operation of the modern 
rule does not appear to have occurred. Professor Sedler,s careful 
study of the "policy-centered, courts that have abrogated the 
vested rights approach reveals that these courts agree on the way 
to solve almost all of the typical practical problems.117 Professor Le-
flar has reached a similar conclusion, lmding that "modern deci-
sions, regardless of exact language, are substantially consistent 
with each other/,118 
C. Is a Policy-Oriented Approach Needed? 
The developing law is clearest in actions where two residents 
have an automobile accident in a foreign jurisdiction where a guest 
statute or an interspousal immunity doctrine is in effect, and re-
turn to litigate in their home state, which permits recovery. Profes-
sor Sedler,s survey of recent choice-of-law decisions reveals that all 
states that have espoused the modern methodology uniformly hold 
that "when two residents of the forum are involved in an accident 
in another state, the law of the forum applies/,119 
Thus, the McMillan pattern-spouses from a nonimmunity state 
litigating as adverse parties claims arising from an accident that 
occurred in an immunity state-has become a textbook illustration 
of the urgent need to reject the place-of-injury rule.60 Professor 
Weintraub even suggests that, in this setting, enforcing a foreign 
immunity may deny equal protection by irrationally distinguishing 
the plaintiff from other injured forum residents based solely on the 
fortuitous situs of the accident. 61 Indeed, some states that retain 
the place-of-injury rule carve out an exception and refuse on 
grounds of local policy to apply foreign intrafamilial immunity 
doctrines. 62 
majority follows Kell and applies the law of the forum. I d. 
"' See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text. 
a• See Sedler, supra note 33, at 1032-41. 
"' R. LEFLAR, supra note 6, § 109, at 219. 
ao Sedler, supra note 33, at 1033 (emphasis omitted). 
80 See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 1; id. § 1.5, at 8; id. § 6.9, at 278. 
81 Id. § 9.4, at 547. 
•• See Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976) (parental immunity); Sweeney v. 
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McMillan itself illustrates the absurdity of not implementing the 
law of the forum in such cases. In 1971, the Supreme Court abol-
ished interspousal immunity in automobile accident cases, relying 
on the pervasiveness of insurance coverage and the strong policy of 
compelling wrongdoers to compensate their victims.88 Tennessee 
chooses to maintain that immunity, notwithstanding modern in-
surance practices," in the belief that immunity preserves family 
harmony.85 McMillan, though, involved Virginia spouses and a 
Virginia insurer; Tennessee's interests were not at stake. Thus, by 
adhering to the arbitrary place-of-injury rule in McMillan, the 
Court subordinated important Virginia policies to Tennessee in-
terests that, in the circumstances, were merely abstract. 
Even if the modern approach failed to produce uniform results, 
the McMillan decision would be. unjustified. Modern analysis 
clearly does fail to provide quick answers to all hard choice-of-law 
problems. To its credit, though, current theory focuses the court's 
attention on the critical policies underlying doctrines in conflict. 
McMillan's place-of-injury rule may be simple and even relatively 
predictable, but it is also highly arbitrary and ignores the intrica-
cies of life. The outrageous results that the traditional rule pro-
duces make its supposed certainty a dubious virtue. Moreover, as 
Professor Weintraub has stated: 
[I]n shaping legal rules to apply to the complexities of the human 
condition, a quest for absolute certainty and complete simplicity is 
a child's dream. Rigid, simple rules produce irrational and dysfunc-
tional solutions to variable, complex problems. Legal rules should 
be, perhaps inevitably must be, rules that produce socially desir-
able solutions to the problems to which those rules are addressed 
and that also are feasible for the members of a learned profession 
to administer. The place-of-wrong rule focuses on the one contact, 
injury, that, in unintentional tort cases, is most likely to be unre-
lated to the policy of any tort rule. The price paid for the simplic-
Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978) (parental immunity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-
5.1 (1967) (interspousal immunity). See also note 38 supra. 
aa See authorities cited note 35 supra. See also Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183-84, 
183 S.E.2d 196, 193-94 (1971) (citing modem insurance practices in support of the abroga-
tion of parental immunity in automobile accident cases). 
" See Childress v. Childress, 569 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tenn. 1978). 
aa See Wooley v. Parker, 222 Tenn. 104, 107-08, 432 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (1968) (quoting 
Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 59, 179 S.W. 628, 628-29 (1915)). 
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ity of that ,rule is, therefore, too high. 66 
Certainty and predictability are now developing as the courts ap-
ply policy-oriented tests to current choice-of-law problems in tort 
cases. "This body of law," Professor Leflar observes, "is being 
lifted up by the courts to a well-watered plateau high above the 
sinkhole that it once occupied."67 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that" '[t]he nature of 
the common law requires that each time a rule of law is applied it 
be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and needs 
of the times have not so changed as to make further application of 
it the instrument of injustice.' "68 The Court's summary reafimna-
tion of the place-of-injury rule in McMillan v. McMillan reveals no 
such scrutiny; as a result, choice of law in Virginia is left in Leflar's 
"sinkhole." The Court squandered an excellent opportunity to join 
the majority of jurisdictions in rejecting the capricious place-of-in-
jury rule in favor of a more modern policy-oriented approach and 
to raise Virginia's choice-of-law theory to the plateau where it now 
rests elsewhere. 
.. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 11, § 6.19, at 312 . 
., Leflar, supra note 51, at 26 . 
.. Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 193, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971) (quoting State v. 
Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957)). 
